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Abstract This paper studies the interaction between savagean uncertainty and time-
preferences. We introduce a variation of the discounted subjective expected utility
model, where time preferences are state dependent. Before uncertainty is resolved,
the individual is unsure about the discount factor that will be used, even when eval-
uating certain payoffs. The model can account for the present bias and diminishing
impatience, even if the future is discounted geometrically. The present bias disap-
pears when the immediate payoff becomes uncertain. Although preferences are not
stationary, choices may be time consistent.
Keywords Diminishing Impatience · Savagean Uncertainty · Hyperbolic Discount-
ing · Time Consistency
1 Introduction
Individuals are impatient. The utility of a reward decreases as the time before its ex-
perience increases. Impatience is typically modelled using a constant discount factor
(Koopmans, 1960). Experimental evidence1 however, suggests that actual discount
factors are not constant, but they decline over time: the further away is a payoff, the
higher is individual’s patience. Such phenomenon is called Diminishing Impatience
(DI), it may be a source of dynamic inconsistency and it is not compatible with the
standard exponential discounting. In this work we propose a possible explanation for
DI stemming from the interaction of savagean uncertainty and intertemporal choice.
Intuitively, uncertainty about the true state of the world may affect the time pref-
erences of the individual, in particular, the discount factor used to evaluate future
utility attached to the state. For example, the value of a sure payment at time t may
depend on the result of a diagnostic test conducted before t, even though the utility
Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Piazza Scaravilli 2, Bologna, E-mail:
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1 See Thaler (1981); Benzion et al (1989) and more recently, Epper et al (2011); Andreoni and Sprenger
(2012); Halevy (2015), for evidence of diminishing impatience.
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of the payment remains the same. What affects the present value of the payment is
the possibility of being more or less impatient, conditional on the result of the test.2
Before uncertainty is resolved, the individual is unsure about the discount factor she
will use, even when evaluating risk-free future payoffs. In turn, linear aggregation of
state-dependent discount factors generates diminishing impatience. When uncertainty
is resolved, the individual discounts the future utility exponentially, according to the
discount factor attached to the realized state. Formally, the Uncertain Discount Ex-
pected Utility (UDEU) model evaluates an uncertain consumption plan c : Ω → X∞
(a map from states of natureΩ to consumption streams (c0(ω),c1(ω),c2(ω), . . .) and
X ⊂ R) by:
V (c) = Ep
[
∞
∑
t=0
δ (ω)tu(ct(ω))
]
(UDEU)
where ω ∈ Ω is a Savage state of the world and p is a subjective probability. The
model can be interpreted in the following way: the individual fixes a state ω , she
calculates the present value of the consumption stream in ω , (c0(ω),c1(ω), . . .) ac-
cording to the utility u over payoffs and the discount factor δ (ω). She repeats the
same procedure for all states and she aggregates the present values using the subjec-
tive probability p. When evaluating consumption plans that do not depend on the state
of the world, the actual discount factor is the subjective expected value of the discount
factors Ep[δ (ω)t ]. Diminishing impatience occurs since, as the delay increases, the
more patient factors decrease more slowly than the less patient ones, lowering the
overall impatience (Theorem 1). Therefore, diminishing impatience arises naturally
as the result of state-dependent time preferences. Violations of stationarity (diminish-
ing impatience) are often identified with time inconsistency, i.e. dynamic preference
reversal. However, the two properties are logically independent: stationarity restricts
preferences at a given point in time, whereas dynamic consistency restricts prefer-
ences at different points in time. Halevy (2015) clarified the relation between the
two, showing that non-stationary preferences are time inconsistent only if they are
stable over time, a property called time invariance. We generalize the result to infinite
consumption streams and we give a sufficient condition to observe an UDEU utility
that is non-stationary but time consistent. The condition restricts the time evolution of
subjective probabilities. This extends to the Savage’s setting the approaches of Sozou
(1998); Azfar (1999); Halevy (2005), who proposed non-stationary but time consis-
tent models of choice assuming objective uncertainty (risk). Differently from these,
in our model, bayesian updating of subjective probabilities may be at odds with time
consistency (see Example 1).
The contribution of the paper is twofold: first, we show how diminishing impa-
tience arises naturally in a setting where time preferences may depend on the realiza-
tion of the state of nature. Our approach is less artificial than alternative approaches
assuming uncertainty about the discount rates from the outset. Indeed, our model
provides a foundation for the Implicit Risk Approach.3 According to such theory, a
subjective risk is attached to any future outcome: for example, the mortality risk or
2 Section 2 contains an alternative example.
3 See Halevy (2005) for references.
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the possibility that a promise may be breached. In our model, uncertainty about the
future is due to uncertainty about time preferences and it is completely subjective.
Our model extends those assuming uncertainty coming from mortality rates. Indeed,
UDEU can be interpreted as a model of uncertain lifetime, if δ (ω)t is interpreted
as the probability of "reaching" time t. But it is not restricted to such interpretation,
since state-dependent time preferences may follow from alternative explanations. For
example, uncertainty about future wealth, education, self-control. Fisher (1930) pro-
posed six "personal factors" that may influence impatience: foresight, self-control,
habit, expectation of life, concerns for the lives of other persons, fashion. If uncer-
tainty affects one of the factors, impatience is random. Second, we show that also in
the subjective uncertainty setting, we can explain a variety of behavioral patterns re-
lated to non-stationarity and time consistency. The UDEU may exhibit non-stationary
and time inconsistent choices (if we retain time invariance). Alternatively, the UDEU
can accommodate non-stationary but time consistent choices (if we drop time invari-
ance). Lastly, the UDEU can also reproduce a discounting behavior that resembles
the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model of Laibson (1997), although the nature is
different. It corresponds to the UDEU with only two distinct discount factors, one of
which is extremely impatient (see Sec. 3.1). For example, evaluating future payments
before a dangerous surgery. In this case, the discount functions is equivalent to the
β -δ model, where β is the probability of the extremely impatient rate (die during the
surgery).
The interaction between time and uncertainty as a possible explanation for dimin-
ishing impatience has been proposed, under various forms, in the literature. Halevy
(2008); Epper and Fehr-Duda (2015); Baucells and Heukamp (2012); Saito (2015)
identify delayed payments with objective lotteries, since any future payoff is intrin-
sically uncertain, for example, due to mortality risk. In the objective risk domain,
this identification establishes a one-to-one relation between violations of expected
utility (non-linear weighting of probabilities) and violations of stationarity.4 Such
identification is supported experimentally (Keren and Roelofsma, 1995; Baucells and
Heukamp, 2010, see). Our approach differs from this, since in the Savage’s setting
there is no objective risk and the relation between violations of expected utility and
non-stationarity breaks down. We can have non-stationary discount with subjective
expected utility (see Th. 1) and stationary discount with non-linear subjective ex-
pected utility (see Section 7). Alternative models such as Azfar (1999); Farmer and
Geanakoplos (2009), explained DI assuming uncertainty in the discount factor and
retaining expected utility. However, the assumption that subjective discount factors
are uncertain per se is difficult to support outside the realm of finance. Our approach
offers a possible rationale for uncertainty in the discount factors: state-dependent time
preferences. All the results in our setting depend on the effect of uncertainty, there-
fore, our explanation of diminishing impatience does no substitute those proposed in
deterministic settings (for example lack of self-control). What we want to highlight is
that with Savage’s uncertainty, diminishing impatience may be natural and not related
to lack of self-control or uncertainty in the experience of future payoffs.
4 A relevant corrigendum of Halevy (2008) and Saito (2011) is Chakraborty and Halevy (2016), where
the correct relations between violations of stationarity and violations of expected utility are presented.
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While state dependent preferences are natural, the exponential discounting form
of conditional preferences δ (ω)tu(ct(ω)) may be questioned. Firstly, the current
work contributes to a literature who explains diminishing impatience exploiting the
interaction between time preferences and uncertainty. Since we are assuming that
uncertainty is the only driving force behind diminishing impatience, it is natural to
posit that absence of uncertainty or the knowledge of the true state of the world should
make preferences stationary. This is true in the UDEU, due to exponential discount-
ing of conditional preferences. If the individual knows the true state of the world ωˆ ,
she will evaluate future consumption using δ (ωˆ)tu(ct(ωˆ)), a stationary preference.
In other words, if the state of the world affects the individual’s tastes about future
consumption, when knowing the true state she can anticipate her future tastes and be-
have rationally. This prediction is peculiar to our model since, it is the unique model
studying the interaction between discount and subjective uncertainty. Indeed, if we
introduce a precise form of subjective uncertainty in the immediate payoffs (see Fact
1), diminishing impatience should disappear. This is a testable restriction that can be
used to validate or falsify the model.
Lastly, in Section 7, we relax the expected utility assumption allowing for a
different attitude toward the uncertainty coming from the states of the world and
the "future", in the spirit of Nau (2006); Ergin and Gul (2009). Relaxing linearity
in probability we can observe stationary preferences also in the presence of state-
dependent time preference. Therefore, the result linking diminishing impatience and
uncertain discount factors, is peculiar to the (state-dependent) expected utility form
of the UDEU.
2 An introductory example
Suppose an individual has to choose between two different payments. One smaller but
immediate r, the other R larger but in 7 days. The choice is between (r,0) and (R,7).
The individual, however, is uncertain about the possibility of receiving an offer for a
permanent job position. The states of the world are Ω = {o,¬o} and each one occurs
with subjective probability p = 0.5. We assume that the job offer does not affect the
utility of each payment, but it affects the impatience of the individual, intuitively, if
the offer occurs the patience is higher (for example, the individual is more relaxed
or less impatient because she expects higher income in the future5). In case of offer,
δ (o) = 0.99, whereas δ (¬o) = 0.3. Suppose we want to know the current preference
 of the individual for the two payments and before knowing if the job offer will
arrive or not. Next table sums up the information about probability and the discount
factors attached to each state.
The individual is asked today to rank the following pairs of alternatives: Assume
that the value of each payment is u(r) = 4 and u(R) = 7. Then, according to UDEU,6
(r,0) (R,7). Suppose now that both payments are delayed by one week. The choice
5 The positive relation between income and patience dates back to Fisher (1930): "The degree of his
impatience depends on his entire income stream, beginning at the present instant and stretching indefinitely
into the future."
6 4(0.5×0.990 +0.5×0.30)> 7(0.5×0.37 +0.5×0.997).
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¬o o
p 0.5 0.5
δ 0.3 0.99
(r,0) t = 0
o r
¬o r
(R,7) t = 7
o R
¬o R
now is between (r,7) and (R,14). Assuming again u(r) = 4 and u(R) = 7, simple cal-
culations show that (R,14)  (r,7). Today, the individual prefers the earlier/sooner
payment, but she reverses her preferences when both are equally postponed. This is
the preference reversal often ascribed to diminishing impatience. However, it follows
from uncertainty about impatience, rather than lack of self control. In addition, un-
certainty about the job offer is the only reason for exhibiting diminishing impatience.
If the individual knew the true state of the world, her preference would be stationary.
Indeed, suppose "o" is the true state and it is known to the individual, it follows that
(R,7) (r,0) and (R,14) (r,7), the preference of an individual who discounts the
future geometrically. In our model, uncertainty is the unique driver of diminishing
impatience.
2.1 Related literature
The present work contributes to a strand of literature which exploits the interaction
between time preferences and uncertainty to explain diminishing impatience. The
consideration that any future payoff is intrinsically uncertain dates back to Fisher
(1930) and Yaari (1965). Mortality risk, for example, invariably affects any future
payoff. This intuition is supported experimentally (Keren and Roelofsma (1995); We-
ber and Chapman (2005); Myerson et al (2003) and Baucells and Heukamp (2010)).
The paper is closely related to a class of models that jointly accommodate diminishing
impatience and time consistent choices. In the models of Sozou (1998); Azfar (1999);
Halevy (2005), bayesian updating of mortality risk leads to time-consistent choices,
while maintaining diminishing impatience. Our model is different in two dimensions:
first we consider subjective uncertainty. Indeed, Sozou (1998); Halevy (2005) assume
the existence of an uncertain hazard rate governing the probability of experiencing fu-
ture utility. Whereas, Azfar (1999) and Farmer and Geanakoplos (2009) rationalize
diminishing impatience directly assuming uncertainty in the discount rate. Second,
in our model bayesian updating of beliefs may not be sufficient to give time consis-
tency (see Example 1). Along the same lines, Dasgupta and Maskin (2005) assume
a known hazard rate coupled with uncertainty about the timing at which payoffs are
realized, to rationalize dynamic preference reversal. To the best of our knowledge,
Higashi et al (2009) is the only work with an axiomatization of subjectively ran-
dom discount factors, however, their primitive is a preference over menus of objec-
tive lotteries. The alternative explanations proposed by Halevy (2008), Saito (2015),
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Baucells and Heukamp (2012) and Epper and Fehr-Duda (2015) were discussed in
the introduction. Alternative explanations of diminishing impatience rely on non-
geometric discounting such as the hyperbolic discounting model of Loewenstein and
Prelec (1992), whereas the more parsimonious model of Laibson (1997) accounts for
the present bias. Axiomatic foundations of the latter are provided by Hayashi (2003)
and Montiel Olea and Strzalecki (2014). Bleichrodt et al (2009) introduced two flex-
ible classes of discount functions that generalize hyperbolic discounting allowing for
different degrees of relative and absolute DI. Hyperbolic, quasi-hyperbolic discount-
ing and the classes of Bleichrodt et al (2009) do not cope with uncertainty. Harris
and Laibson (2013) introduced the Present-Future model, a stochastic extension of
the subjective discount model of Luttmer and Mariotti (2003), in which uncertainty
concerns the duration of the "present" and the Instantaneous Gratification model, a
limiting case of the Present-Future model. However, they do not provide any behav-
ioral foundation. In a different domain, Jackson and Yariv (2014) and Millner and
Heal (2016) obtain results, similar to Theorem 1 and Theorem 3, as a consequence of
aggregating preferences of individuals with heterogeneous discount factors.
3 Uncertain discount expected utility and diminishing impatience
In this section, we introduce our model and we show how preferences represented by
the UDEU can exhibit diminishing impatience. Time is discrete and infinite, t ∈N and
N= {0,1,2 . . .}. We assume the existence of a finite setΩ , containing the states of the
world with |Ω |> 2. We denote ∆(Ω), the simplex overΩ . The set of consequences is
a bounded interval of X ⊂Rwe can normalize to be equal to [0,1]. An act is a function
h : Ω → X∞, associating to each state of the world ω ∈ Ω , a consumption stream
h(ω) = {h0(ω),h1(ω), . . .} ∈ X∞, where ht(ω) denotes the element of X associated
to the act h at time t and state ω . The set of all acts is denoted H . The individual
has a preference < over acts. We assume that uncertainty resolves after a choice
is made but before time 0, hence consumption at time zero may be uncertain but
it is not discounted. We do not assume any preference for early or late resolution of
uncertainty. If an act is independent of the state, i.e. ht(ω) = ht(ω ′) for all ω,ω ′ ∈Ω ,
we call it a state-independent act and we, sometimes, write x=(x0,x1, . . .). We denote
X∞, the set of all state-independent acts. If an act is also independent of time, i.e.
ht(ω) = z, for all ω ∈Ω , t ∈N and some z ∈ X , we call it a constant act. We can now
introduce our UDEU representation:
Definition 1 An UDEU representation of < is a tuple (V,u,{δ (ω)}ω∈Ω , p) with u :
X→R, δ (ω)∈ (0,1] for all ω ∈Ω , p∈ ∆(Ω), V :H →R, such that, V (h)≥V (h′),
if and only if, h< h′ and
V (h) = ∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω)
∞
∑
t=0
δ (ω)tu(ht(ω))
The UDEU generalizes the discounted (subjective) expected utility model al-
lowing for state-dependent time preferences. In the case of a state-independent act
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h = (x0,x1, . . .), UDEU becomes
V (h) =
∞
∑
t=0
Ep[δ (ω)t ]u(xt)
the actual discount factor Ep[δ (ω)t ] is a weighted average of the state-dependent dis-
count factors δ (ω), where weights are given by the subjective probabilities. There-
fore, although state-independent acts are not affected by uncertainty, the actual dis-
count factor depends on the belief and the time preference. We now show how UDEU
can account for diminishing impatience (or hyperbolic preferences) and, in particular,
the present bias.
First, take an arbitrary o ∈ X and set u(o) = 0. We denote (x, t) ∈ X∞, the state-
independent act h defined as: h(ω) = (o,o, . . . ,x,o, . . .) for allω ∈Ω and x is payed at
time t. Clearly, V (x, t) = u(x)Ep[δ (ω)t ], hence (x, t) can be interpreted as a payment
x at time t. We use the following definitions:
Definition 2
DI. < exhibits diminishing impatience, if for any y > x > 0 and 0 < t,
(x, t)∼ (y, t+1) implies (x, t−1) (y, t)
PB. < exhibits the present bias, if for any y > x > 0 and 0 < t
(x, t)∼ (y, t+1) implies (x,0) (y,1)
According to DI, as the payments are delayed the bigger payoff becomes more
attractive than the smaller one. The present bias is the particular case of diminish-
ing impatience at 0. When discounting is hyperbolic, as in Loewenstein and Prelec
(1992), and the utility and the discount function are separated, the preference ex-
hibits diminishing impatience. The quasi-hyperbolic discounting of Laibson (1997)
exhibits the PB but not DI. We can equivalently define DI and the PB in terms of an
impatience index (see Halevy, 2008). Assuming V (x0,x1 . . .) = ∑∞t=0 d(t)u(xt), with
d(0) = 1. Let I(t) = d(t)d(t+1) then,
1. DI is equivalent to I(t)> I(t+1) for all t ≥ 0
2. PB is equivalent to I(0)> I(t) for all t > 0
The next result shows that the UDEU exhibits DI:
Theorem 1 Let I(t)= Ep[δ (ω)
t ]
Ep[δ (ω)t+1]
, there exists δ (ω) 6= δ (ω ′)with p(ω)> 0, p(ω ′)>
0, if and only if, < exhibits diminishing impatience.
As the time horizon increases, the more patient discount factors decline more
slowly than the less patient ones, lowering the overall impatience. Therefore, dimin-
ishing impatience and the present bias arise naturally when time preferences depend
on the state of the world and preferences are aggregated linearly.
As a side note, the UDEU model is related to the discount of "far future" intro-
duced by Weitzman (1998, 2001). He claims that, under uncertainty of the discount
rates, the evaluation of very long-term projects, as climate change policies, mineral
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depletion, radioactive waste disposal, should be made using the average of discount
factors, i.e. E[δ˜ t ] rather than discount rates7 E[δ˜ ]t . Our model and its axiomatic foun-
dation in Section 5 offers a rationalization of Weitzman’s approach, since the UDEU
can be interpreted as the utility of a planner that evaluates the present value of very-
long term policies under uncertainty of the discount rates. Our results show that the
Weitzman approach implies diminishing impatience (of the planner) but may be time
consistent, as we will see in the Section 4. In addition, we discuss in Section 7 the
consequences of relaxing the linear aggregation of discount factors. Diminishing im-
patience may disappear if discount factors are aggregated non-linearly, showing that
Th. 1 and the result of Weitzman strongly depend on the linearity of the aggregation
rule.
3.1 UDEU and quasi-hyperbolic discounting
A particular case of UDEU generates a discounting behavior that resembles the quasi-
hyperbolic discounting model of Laibson (1997). In the quasi-hyperbolic discounting
model, the discount factor is equal to 1 at time t = 0 and to βδ t at time t > 0 for some
β ∈ [0,1]. Consider the UDEU model with only two distinct discount factors, call
them δ and ε , with the second very close to zero (or even equal to zero if we define
00 = 1). In that case, when evaluating a state-independent act, we have Ep[δ (ω)t ] =
pδ t +(1− p)ε t . It corresponds to
Ep[δ (ω)t ] =
{
1 t = 0
pδ t +(1− p)ε t ≈ pδ t t > 0
For t > 0, Ep[δ (ω)t ] ≈ pδ t , since for ε small enough the second term is negligible
or equal to zero if 00 = 1. Such an extreme case of UDEU, where the individual is
completely impatient in a given state (or event) and has the same discount factor in all
the remaining states (or events), can generate the same discount of a quasi-hyperbolic
function, however, our β -δ discounting is actually a p-δ . To be more concrete, con-
sider the case of an individual evaluating a future sure payment before a dangerous
surgery. With probability p, she will survive and discount a future payment accord-
ing to δ . In the worst case of not surviving, the value of any future payment is zero,
equivalent to complete discount. In this case, it is natural to observe a "present bi-
ased" attitude toward the future. Clearly, the nature of the two is extremely different
and we are not considering our approach as a foundation for quasi-hyperbolic dis-
counting. We are only considering an extreme case of our model that can generate
similar predictions.
4 Time consistency and time invariance
In this section, we extend the UDEU model to repeated choices over time and we
discuss the relation between time consistency and non-stationarity. Violations of sta-
7 Gollier (2004) proposed an alternative rationale giving the opposite result, impatience should be in-
creasing. This is called "Weitzman-Gollier puzzle" (Gollier and Weitzman, 2010).
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tionarity are often identified with violations of time consistency, however, the two
notions are independent. Stationarity is a static property, it restricts preferences at a
given point in time. Time consistency is a dynamic property, it relates preferences
at different points in time. As elegantly proved by Halevy (2015), non-stationarity
and time inconsistency are equivalent only if preferences do not change over time,
a property called time invariance.8 We extend the result of Halevy (2015) relating
stationarity, time consistency and time invariance to our setting and we show how
the UDEU model can accommodate non-stationary but time consistent choices. We
provide a sufficient condition restricting the evolution of beliefs over time: if subjec-
tive probabilities exactly counterbalance the impact of higher discount factors on the
overall patience, the individual exhibits diminishing impatience but time consistent
choices. Such result extends to the subjective uncertainty setting the results of Sozou
(1998); Azfar (1999); Halevy (2005). Differently from them, bayesian updating of
beliefs may not guarantee time consistent choices (see Example 1). We consider a
family of preferences {<τ}∞τ=0, each of which is represented by an UDEU. The as-
sumption we make in the first part of this section is the following: at each decision
time τ the individual faces the same choice problem, that is, information about the
realization of the state of the world in the previous dates is irrelevant (uncertainty is
i.i.d). We may also interpret such setting as if, each <τ represents the preferences of
a "self" facing the same choice problem of the other selves. Notice that i.i.d. uncer-
tainty is a property of the underlying stochastic environment and not of preferences.
We use such setting since, it allows a direct comparison with the definitions of Halevy
(2015) and because the results we develop here are useful to understand what hap-
pens in our model when learning takes place. We will relax such an assumption in the
next section.
First, we introduce the definitions of stationarity, time invariance and time con-
sistency adapted from Halevy (2015) to our setting (similar definitions are proposed
in Millner and Heal (2016)). To offer a direct comparison with the setting of Halevy
(2015), all of our definitions consider state-independent acts only. For a given state-
independent act x ∈ X∞ and a given z ∈ X , we denote (z,x) the shift-forward of x, i.e.
(z,x) = (z,x0,x1, . . .). The following is the standard definition of stationarity:
(Stationarity). <τ is stationary if for all x,y ∈ X∞ and z ∈ X
x∼τ y ⇐⇒ (z,x)∼τ (z,y)
Preferences over deterministic consumption streams are not reversed when consump-
tion is shifted. As anticipated, stationarity is a "static" property: it restricts preferences
at time τ only. In the previous section, we showed that the UDEU violates stationarity.
The following property, time invariance, imposes consistency between preferences at
different points in time:
(Time Invariance). {<τ}∞τ=0 are time invariant if for all x,y ∈ X∞ and all τ,τ ′ ∈ N,
x∼τ y ⇐⇒ x∼τ ′ y
8 In his experiment, up to 20% of the subjects made non-stationary but time consistent choices.
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The ranking of state-independent acts does not depend on the decision date.9 Lastly,
we introduce the notion of time consistent preferences:
(Time Consistency). {<τ}∞τ=0 are time consistent if for all x,y ∈ X∞ and z ∈ X and
τ ∈ N,
(z,x)∼τ (z,y) ⇐⇒ x∼τ+1 y
Preferences are time consistent if the ranking of state-independent acts does not
change after a common history.10 It precludes ex-post (tomorrow) deviations from
an ex-ante (today) plan. The following theorem relates the preceding properties and
it is a direct generalization of Proposition 4 in Halevy (2015).
Theorem 2 Any two of the three properties: stationarity, time consistency and time
invariance, imply the third.
As in the setting of Halevy (2015), non-stationarity implies time inconsistency
only if preferences are stable over time, i.e. they are time invariant. In Section 3,
we proved that the UDEU model exhibits non-stationary preferences. According to
Theorem 2, if a preference represented by the UDEU is time consistent, it must vio-
late time invariance. Alternatively, if a preference represented by the UDEU is time
invariant, it must violate time consistency.
The first step is to understand what are the consequences of assuming time invari-
ance for a family of UDEUs preferences {<τ}∞τ=0. Since each <τ is represented by a
tuple
(
Vτ ,uτ ,{δτ(ω)}ω∈Ω , pτ
)
, there are many elements that may vary from time to
time: pure tastes over outcomes uτ , subjective probabilities pτ and time preferences
{δτ(ω)}ω∈Ω . Before going to the result, we need some notation: we write uτ ≡ uτ ′ ,
if uτ ′ is a positive affine transformation of uτ . In the following proposition we restrict
our attention to the case of time invariant tastes, i.e. the utility of final outcomes does
not change across decision times.
Proposition 1 Suppose that uτ ≡ uτ ′ for all for all τ,τ ′ ∈ N then, {<τ}∞τ=0 satisfy
time invariance, if and only if, Epτ [δτ(ω)t ] = Epτ ′ [δτ ′(ω)
t ], for all t > 0.
Time invariance is equivalent to equality of the "actual discount factor" across
decision times. It is clearly different from saying that discount factors δτ(ω)= δτ ′(ω)
are equal across decision times. It follows that a family of time invariant UDEU
preferences that agree on the ranking of final outcomes, is represented by
Vτ(x) =
∞
∑
t=τ
u(xt)d(t− τ)
where d(t− τ) = Epτ [δτ(ω)t−τ ] and d is independent of τ .
Differently, if a family of UDEUs is time consistent, it has to violate time invari-
ance and, by Proposition 1, discount factors cannot be stable across decision times.
The next theorem gives a sufficient condition for time consistency of a family of
UDEUs in terms of time evolution of beliefs.
9 The meaning of invariance is the following (see Halevy, 2015)): (x′,x′′,x′′′, . . .)∼τ (y′,y′′,y′′′, . . .), if
and only if (x′,x′′,x′′′, . . .)∼τ+1 (y′,y′′,y′′′, . . .).
10 The meaning of consistency is the following (see Halevy, 2015)): (z,x′,x′′, . . .) ∼τ (z,y′,y′′, . . .), if
and only if (x′,x′′, . . .)∼τ+1 (y′,y′′, . . .).
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Theorem 3 Suppose that δτ(ω) = δτ ′(ω) = δ (ω) for all τ,τ ′ ∈ N and all ω ∈ Ω
and uτ ≡ uτ ′ for all τ,τ ′ ∈ N, if
pτ+1(ω) =
pτ(ω)δ (ω)
∑ω ′∈Ω pτ(ω ′)δ (ω ′)
then, {<τ}∞τ=0 satisfy time consistency.
As discussed after Theorem 1, diminishing impatience occurs because the more
patient discount factors decline more slowly than the less patient ones. The condi-
tion on the subjective probabilities in Theorem 3 guarantees time consistency since,
it is exactly sufficient to counterbalance such phenomenon.11 As the decision time
increases, the individual has to lower the weight attached to the more patient factors.
To see this point, consider the impatience index Iτ(t) of Theorem 1 at decision time
τ ,
Iτ(t) =
Epτ [δ (ω)t−τ ]
Epτ [δ (ω)t+1−τ ]
for all t ≥ τ and at time τ+1,
Iτ+1(s) =
Epτ+1 [δ (ω)
s−τ−1]
Epτ+1 [δ (ω)s+1−τ−1]
=
Epτ+1 [δ (ω)
s−τ−1]
Epτ+1 [δ (ω)s−τ ]
for all s≥ τ+1. By the condition on Theorem 3, the two are equal for all periods after
τ . For example, for t = s = τ + 1, we have Iτ(τ + 1) =
Epτ [δ (ω)]
Epτ [δ (ω)2]
and Iτ+1(τ + 1) =
1
Epτ+1 [δ (ω)]
, by the condition of Theorem 3, Iτ+1(τ + 1) = 1Epτ [δ (ω)2][Epτ [δ (ω)]]−1 =
Iτ(τ+1). Intuitively, the relative impatience between two subsequent future periods
as seen from today coincides with the same measure as seen from tomorrow. Clearly,
if discount factors are equal across states, the condition in Theorem 3 reduces to
pτ+1(ω) = pτ(ω), and by Proposition 1, preferences become time invariant and then
stationary. To sum up, in a setting where uncertainty is identical at each decision
time, time consistency may coexist with non-stationary preferences, if beliefs are
updated in a way that counterbalance the increasing patience of the individual. As
noted above, identical uncertainty at each decision time is a property of the underlying
stochastic framework and not of preferences. Therefore, the fact of observing time
varying subjective beliefs is not precluded in this setting.
4.1 Bayesian updating and time consistency
In this section, we study the problem of having time consistency when beliefs are
updated after the acquisition of new information. Let Σ be an algebra of events de-
fined on Ω . For each event E ∈ Σ , let fEg the act delivering f (ω) ∈ X∞ if ω ∈ E
and g otherwise. Suppose that for each event E ∈ Σ , the individual has conditional
preference <E , representing her behavior if E occurs. Time consistency in the static
11 A similar condition has been proposed by Millner and Heal (2016) in a different choice problem: time
consistency of a social planner that aggregates preferences of individuals with different discount factors.
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setting imposes consistency between conditional preferences <E and the uncondi-
tional preference <. The following definition is due to Ghirardato (2002) in a static
setting: fEg < g if and only if f <E g, for all E ∈ Σ . Conditional preferences <E
can be defined through ex-ante preferences <. Such condition, plus additional stan-
dard axioms, guarantees that in a state-independent expected utility setting, ex-post
preferences are represented by the bayesian updating of the subjective probability
representing<. Suppose that there exists a filtration {Fτ}τ∈N defined on Ω and gen-
erated by a finite partition. At time τ , the individual knows that the true state of the
world ω belongs to an event E ∈Fτ(ω), where Fτ(ω) is the cell of the partition
containing ω . For each event E ∈Fτ(ω) containing ω , let <τ+1,E represents pref-
erence at time τ conditional on the occurrence of E. We assume that each <τ+1,E is
represented by an UDEU,
(
Vτ+1,E ,uτ+1,E ,{δτ+1,E(ω)}ω∈Ω , pτ+1,E
)
, hence:
Vτ+1,E(h) = Epτ+1,E
[
∞
∑
s=τ+1
δτ+1,E(ω)s−τ+1uτ+1,E(hs−τ+1(ω))
]
It is important to notice that pτ+1,E is a probability distribution that is not necessarily
the bayesian updating of pτ . Karni (2007, Th. 3) axiomatized such representation in
a static setting. Consider the following contingent version of time consistency that is
comparable with the one proposed earlier:
(Contingent Time Consistency). {<τ}∞τ=0 are contingently time consistent if for all
x,y ∈ X∞ and z ∈ X , E ∈Fτ(ω) and τ ∈ N,
(z,x)E(z,y)∼τ (z,y) ⇐⇒ x∼τ+1,E y
The condition generalizes time consistency (the two coincide for E = Ω ) imposing
consistency between ex-ante conditional preferences and ex-post choices, but only
for state-independent acts.
Theorem 4 Suppose that δτ(ω) = δτ+1,E(ω) = δ (ω) for all τ ∈ N and all ω ∈ Ω
and uτ ≡ uτ+1,E for all τ ∈ N, if
pτ+1,E(ω) =
{
pτ (ω)δ (ω)
∑ω ′∈ E pτ (ω ′)δ (ω ′)
if ω ∈ E
0 if ω 6∈ E
then, {<τ}∞τ=0 satisfy contingent time consistency.
The condition δτ(ω) = δτ+1(ω) implies that time preferences are stable across
decision dates, what changes is the subjective probability of each state. If E = Ω ,
we are back to the case of Theorem 3. Clearly, if discount factors are all constant,
the condition in Theorem 4 corresponds to bayesian updating of beliefs. However,
the presence of state-dependent time preferences requires a correction of updated
probability to restore time consistency. Indeed, the following example shows that
bayesian updating of probabilities, i.e. pτ+1,E(ω) = pτ+1(ω|E) = pτ (ω)∑ω ′∈E pτ (ω ′) , may
not guarantee contingent time consistency in the presence of state-dependent time
preferences.
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Example 1 (Time inconsistency with bayesian updating) Assume Ω = {ω1,ω2,ω3}
and p(ωi) = 13 . Discount factors are δ (ω1) =
10
12 , δ (ω2) = 0 and δ (ω3) =
9
10 . Let
(z,x0,x1) = (z,1,0) and (z,y0,y1) = (z,0,1.2) and E = {ω1,ω2}. Suppose that we
have an UDEU representation of the unconditional preference <0 given by
(V0,u,{δ (ω)}ω∈Ω , p0). And a representation of conditional preferences <1,E given
by (V1,E ,u,{δ (ω)}ω∈Ω , p1(·|E)). So, preference over final outcomes and time pref-
erences are identical and the subjective probability is updated with the Bayes’ rule.
Assume that u(x) = x, then
(z,x0,x1)E(z,y0,y1)∼0 (z,y0,y1) and (x0,x1) 6∼1,E (y0,y1)
Indeed, (z,x0,x1)E(z,y0,y1)∼0 (z,y0,y1) since, z+ 13 · 1012 + 13 ·0.92 = z+1.2 · 13 ( 1012
2
+
0.92) which is true. However, (x0,x1) 6∼1,E (y0,y1) since, 1 6= 1.2 ·0.5 · 1012 .
Contingent time consistency and bayesian updating of beliefs may be at odds in
the presence of state-dependent time preferences. Our suspicion is that the two can
hold simultaneously only if discount factors are state-independent (i.e. the standard
discounted expected utility). Therefore, the dynamic consistency definition of Karni
(2007) (A.2 Ordinal Coherence) that generates bayesian updating of subjective prob-
abilities may be too strong to coexist with state-dependent time preferences.
In the case of bayesian updating of beliefs, the assumption of time invariance is
very strong. Indeed, consider the following definition:
(Contingent Time Invariance). {<τ}∞τ=0 are contingently time invariant if for all x,y∈
X∞, E ∈Fτ(ω) and τ ∈ N,
x∼τ y ⇐⇒ x∼τ+1,E y
Contingent preferences are equivalent to unconditional ones. It means that prefer-
ences (over state constant acts) are invariant to the arrival of new information. While
this is often the case in modeling dynamic choice under ambiguity (e.g. Epstein and
Schneider (2003); Maccheroni et al (2006)), in our setting this would imply, by the
same argument of Proposition 1, that: Epτ [δτ(ω)t ] = Epτ+1,E [δτ+1,E(ω)
t ]. Such con-
dition is clearly violated when subjective probabilities are updated by Bayes’ rule,
i.e. pτ+1,E(ω) = pτ+1(ω|E), unless discount rates are all equal across states (i.e.
discounted expected utility). Therefore, there is a tension between time invariance
and information acquisition over time. This is consistent with the models of Sozou
(1998); Azfar (1999); Halevy (2008), where bayesian updating of mortality risk leads
to time consistency, violating time invariance.
5 Axiomatic foundation of UDEU
In this section, we propose an axiomatic foundation of the UDEU. The UDEU is
a simple generalization of the discounted subjective expected that allows for state-
dependent time preferences. Therefore, the axiomatic exercise is devoted to identify
the testable restrictions characterizing state-dependent time preferences.
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The first axiom simply states that preferences are represented by a state-dependent
subjective expected utility. Since the main focus of the paper is on the intertemporal
behavior, we omit the axiomatic foundation of a state-dependent utility, that is pro-
vided by Karni (2007, Th. 3). The most important point to note is that in Karni (2007,
Th. 3), the subjective probability is unique and the state-dependent utilities are unique
up to positive affine transformations.12
Axiom 1 (Utility (Karni, 2007)). < is represented by a state-dependent subjective ex-
pected utility: h 7→∑ω∈Ω p(ω)vω(h(ω)). Where p is unique and {vω : X∞→ R}ω∈Ω
are unique up to positive affine transformations.
The representation in Axiom Utility corresponds to Theorem 3 in Karni (2007)
with E = Ω . Given the state-dependent utility representation, we want to transform
each state-dependent utility vω(·) into a stationary utility. Given ω ∈ Ω , we denote
fωg, the act giving f in state ω and g otherwise. We now define a family of pref-
erences {<ω}ω∈Ω and we write f <ω g, if and only if, fωh < gωh for some h. By
additive separability of the representation, the definition is independent of the h. Each
<ω represents preferences of the individual in the case she knows that the true state of
the world is ω . The next axiom involves conditional preferences only and it imposes
standard geometric discounting conditionally on each state in Ω .
Axiom 2 (Conditional Temporal Axiom).
(Cond. Stationarity). For all state-independent acts x,y ∈ X∞, z ∈ X and ω ∈Ω ,
(z,x)∼ω (z,y) ⇐⇒ x∼ω y
(Cond. Impatience). For all constant acts x,y ∈ X∞, z ∈ X and ω ∈Ω ,
(x,x, . . .)ω (y,y, . . .) ⇐⇒ (x,y,z,z, . . .)ω (y,x,z,z, . . .)
Conditional preferences are stationary and impatient in the Koopmans sense. This
is the axiom that discriminates the UDEU from the discounted expected utility. If
uncertainty of the future is the only force driving diminishing impatience, once un-
certainty is resolved or if there is no uncertainty at all, the individual should behave
rationally. The next axiom implies that the utility of the final outcomes is not state-
dependent.
Axiom 3 (Certainty Consistency.). For all ω,ω ′ ∈Ω and all constant acts x,y ∈ X∞,
(x,x,x, . . .)<ω (y,y,y, . . .) ⇐⇒ (x,x,x, . . .)<ω ′ (y,y,y, . . .)
Turning to the representation theorem, standard arguments lead to the following
result:
12 As noted in Karni (2007, Footnote 7), his results hold for any product of connected, separable, topo-
logical spaces. Our outcome space X∞ satisfies the previous properties. Few conditions characterize the
model: < is a continuous weak order, there exist a best and a worst outcome (A.0 in Karni (2007)) and
Cardinal Coherence (A.1 in Karni (2007)).
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Theorem 5 Axioms Utility, Conditional Temporal Axiom and Certainty Consistency
are satisfied, if and only if, there exists a utility V representing < of the form
V (h) = ∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω)
∞
∑
t=0
δ (ω)tu(ht(ω)) (1)
where p is a unique probability, δ (ω) ∈ (0,1] for all ω ∈ Ω and u is a strictly in-
creasing and cardinally unique utility function.
UDEU is a minimal generalization of subjective discounted expected utility tak-
ing into account the possibility that uncertainty affects pure time preferences.
6 Testing the UDEU
As hinted in the introduction, the structure of UDEU allows us to perform a thought
experiment that resembles the experiment of Keren and Roelofsma (1995). They
show, in an objective risk setting, that the present bias decreases drastically when
the immediate reward becomes risky. The UDEU can capture a similar behavioral
pattern in our Savage’s uncertainty setting. Indeed, if we introduce a particular form
of uncertainty in the immediate payoff, the present bias and diminishing impatience
disappear. The prediction is peculiar to our model and it can be used to falsify or val-
idate the model in a laboratory or field experiment. Let denote (x,ω, t) the following
act (assuming u(o) = 0):
(x,ω, t) =
{
(o,o,o, . . . ,x,o,o) for ω ∈Ω
(o,o,o, . . .) otherwise
It is an act paying x at time t and state ω and zero otherwise, alternatively it can
be written in the previous notation as (o,o,o, . . . ,x,o,o, . . .)ω(o,o,o, . . .). It is the
counterpart of Keren and Roelofsma (1995)’s lotteries in our setting. Now, suppose
that an individual is indifferent between (x,ω, t) and (y,ω, t + 1) for some y,x ∈ X
and t ∈ N. Then we have the following:
Fact 1. For all x,y ∈ X and t, t ′ ∈ N.
(x,ω, t)∼ (y,ω, t+1) ⇐⇒ (x,ω, t ′)∼ (y,ω, t ′+1)
Taking t = 0 gives the desired result. Therefore, introducing a precise form of
uncertainty eliminates DI and the present bias. Since uncertainty resolves immedi-
ately, Fact 1 can be compared to the results of Keren and Roelofsma (1995). The
explanation is similar, although its nature is completely different. The main differ-
ence between the present and the future is the intrinsic uncertainty of the latter. In
the UDEU, the uncertainty of the future comes from uncertainty of the discount fac-
tor, since the present payoff is not discounted, it is certain (when state-independent).
Differently, future payoffs, even the state-independent ones, are invariably "uncer-
tain". The additional impatience at certainty is captured by the inequality I(0)> I(t)
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for all t (when there are at least two different discount factors with strictly positive
probability) or equivalently
1
Ep[δ (ω)]
>
Epδ (ω)t ]
Ep[δ (ω)t+1]
When we introduce uncertainty in the immediate payoff, the present loses its certainty
and the preference is, conditionally to the state of nature, stationary.
The parallelism with Keren and Roelofsma (1995) is only intuitive, since they
used objective risk setting. They offered to subjects the typical choices over sooner/smaller
or later/larger rewards, 100 now or 110 in 4 weeks and 100 in 26 weeks or 110 in 30
weeks. An individual who chooses 100 now in Choice 1. and for 110 in Choice 2.
exhibits the present bias. In the experiment of Keren and Roelofsma (1995), 82% of
the subjects opt for 100 now and 63% for $110 in 30 weeks. Subsequently, Keren
and Roelofsma (1995) proposed the following choices (in all cases the lotteries pay
zero with the residual probability): 100 now with probability 0.9 or 110 in 4 weeks
with probability 0.9 and 100 in 26 weeks with probability 0.9 or 110 in 30 weeks with
probability 0.9. They found that the percentage of individuals choosing the immediate
reward drops to 54% and it is further reduced to 39% in a version of the experiment
with a lower probability of 0.5. Whereas the percentage of subjects choosing 110 in
30 weeks remains quite stable regardless of the probabilities. The result supports the
intuition that the main difference between the future and the present is an intrinsic
uncertainty of the former. If subjects attach more value to certainty (the present), the
present bias occurs. When the present becomes uncertain, this distinction is no longer
valid. The UDEU can account for a similar behavior in the subjective risk setting, i.e.
when probabilities are not fixed exogenously and without assuming additional value
of certainty.
7 Relaxing expected utility
The assumption of linearity in probability in the UDEU is clearly strong. Violations
of expected utility in the Savage’s setting are well-known, for example the Ellsberg’s
paradox (Ellsberg, 1961). Our setting of state-dependent consumption streams is par-
ticularly suitable to be interpreted as a product state-space. Each factor, Ω and N, has
its "uncertainty", Ω as a state of the world, N as the possibility of not experiencing
time t. Hence, each payment ht(ω) ∈ X depends on the resolution of two "sources
of uncertainty". Various models allow for different "sources of uncertainty" toward
which the individual may have a different attitude. For example, Nau (2006); Ergin
and Gul (2009). In our UDEU model, we implicitly assumed that the individual has
the same attitude toward both "sources",Ω andN. Consider the following generaliza-
tion of UDEU that allows for differential attitude toward one source of uncertainty:
VS(h) = ∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω)φ
(
∞
∑
t=0
δ (ω)tu(ht(ω))
)
The utility of an act h is calculated in a two-stage procedure. For a given state of the
worldω , the discounted value of the consumption stream attached to it,∑∞t=0 δ (ω)tu(ht(ω)),
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is calculated. The total value of h is calculated distorting the value of consumption
streams by a function φ : R→ R and aggregating them linearly. As in Nau (2006);
Ergin and Gul (2009), a non-linear φ can be interpreted as a different attitude toward
the uncertainty coming from the "source" N. The question is: are the results of Sec-
tion 3 robust to this relaxation? The following example provides a negative answer.
Example 2 Let φ(r) = ln(r) and consider the acts h = (x, t), h′ = (y, t + 1) and g =
(x,0), g′ = (y,1). Then we have
(x, t)∼ (y, t+1) ⇐⇒ (x,0)∼ (y,1)
i.e. VS(h) =VS(h′), if and only if, VS(g) =VS(g′).
So the preference represented by VS are stationary. The proof is in Appendix.
Relaxing expected utility within the framework of UDEU allows for a variety of
behaviors related to the interplay between uncertainty and time preferences. Both
stationarity and diminishing impatience are possible, even if discount factors are
state-dependent. Concerning applications, Example 2 highlights the dependence of
the Weitzman’s result to the linear aggregation of discount factors.
8 Conclusion
We introduced a model of intertemporal choice that takes into account the intrin-
sic uncertainty of the future through uncertainty in the discount factor. The model
is a simple generalization of the discounted expected utility that allows for state-
dependent time preferences. Its behavioral foundation is straightforward. The model
can account for diminishing impatience and the present bias. In the dynamic exten-
sion, we give a sufficient condition to guarantee non-stationary but time consistent
choices. Surprisingly, bayesian updating of beliefs does not guarantee time consis-
tency.
Appendix. Proofs
Proof. Of Theorem 1. We derive I(t) with respect to t (assuming I(t) as function
from R+→ R+) and we show its derivative is negative.
∂ I(t)
∂ t
=
Ep[δ (ω)t lnδ (ω)]Ep[δ (ω)t+1]−Ep[δ (ω)t ]Ep[δ (ω)t+1 lnδ (ω)]
(Ep[δ (ω)t+1])2
Since δ (ω) are all smaller or equal than one, Ep[δ (ω)t ]≥ Ep[δ (ω)t+1], hence
Ep[δ (ω)t lnδ (ω)]Ep[δ (ω)t+1]−Ep[δ (ω)t ]Ep[δ (ω)t+1 lnδ (ω)]≤
Ep[δ (ω)t ]
(
Ep[δ (ω)t lnδ (ω)]−Ep[δ (ω)t+1 lnδ (ω)]
)
the left-hand side of the previous inequality is equal to
Ep[δ (ω)t ]
(
Ep[δ (ω)t lnδ (ω)(1−δ (ω))]
)
Since (1−δ (ω))≥ 0 and lnδ (ω)≤ 0, the sign of the expression is negative. uunionsq
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Proof. Of Theorem 2. Time invariance and time consistency imply stationarity. By
time consistency (z,x)∼τ (z,y), if and only if, x∼τ+1 y. By time invariance x∼τ+1 y,
if and only if, x∼τ y.
Stationarity and time consistency imply time invariance. Without loss of general-
ity, let τ ′ > τ . By stationarity, x ∼τ y, if and only if, (z,x) ∼τ (z,y). By time consis-
tency, (z,x) ∼τ (z,y), if and only if, x ∼τ+1 y. Repeating the same argument until τ ′
gives the result.
Time invariance and stationarity imply time consistency. By stationarity (z,x)∼τ
(z,y), if and only if, x∼τ y. By time invariance, x∼τ y, if and only if, x∼τ+1 y. uunionsq
Proof. Of Proposition 1. If uτ ≡ uτ ′ and Epτ [δτ(ω)t−τ ] = Epτ ′ [δτ ′(ω)t−τ
′
], for all
τ,τ ′ ∈ N time invariance follows immediately. To see the opposite implication, con-
sider the following state-independent acts h=(x0,x1,z,z,z, . . .) and h′=(y0,y1,z,z,z, . . .),
who differs in the firs two periods only and assume that h∼τ h′. Then by time invari-
ance, h∼τ h′, if and only if, h∼τ ′ h′. Since uτ ≡ uτ ′ , rescale the utilities to be equal.
Then, u(x0) + u(x1)Epτ [δτ(ω)] = u(y0) + u(y1)Epτ [δτ(ω)], if and only if, u(x0) +
u(x1)Epτ ′ [δτ(ω)] = u(y0)+u(y1)Epτ ′ [δτ ′(ω)], or u(x0)−u(y0)+Epτ [δτ(ω)](u(x1)−
u(y1)) = u(x0)−u(y0)+Epτ ′ [δτ ′(ω)](u(x1)−u(y1)) and it follows that Epτ [δτ(ω)] =
Epτ ′ [δτ ′(ω)]. uunionsq
Proof. Of Theorem 3. Suppose that δτ(ω) = δτ ′(ω) = δ (ω) for all τ,τ ′ and all ω ∈
Ω and uτ ≡ uτ ′ for all τ,τ ′, and we normalize the utilities to be all equal. Then, time
consistency holds if
∑
ω∈Ω
pτ(ω)
[
u(z)+
∞
∑
s=1
δ (ω)su(xτ+s)
]
= ∑
ω∈Ω
pτ(ω)
[
u(z)+
∞
∑
s=1
δ (ω)su(yτ+s)
]
or
∞
∑
s=1
u(xτ+s)
[
∑
ω∈Ω
pτ(ω)δ (ω)s
]
=
∞
∑
s=1
u(yτ+s)
[
∑
ω∈Ω
pτ(ω)δ (ω)s
]
(2)
is equivalent to:
∑
ω∈Ω
pτ+1(ω)
[
u(xτ+1)+
∞
∑
s=1
δ (ω)su(xτ+1+s)
]
= ∑
ω∈Ω
pτ+1(ω)
[
u(yτ+1)+
∞
∑
s=1
δ (ω)su(yτ+s)
]
or
∞
∑
s=0
u(xτ+1+s)
[
∑
ω∈Ω
pτ+1(ω)δ (ω)s
]
=
∞
∑
s=0
u(yτ+1+s)
[
∑
ω∈Ω
pτ+1(ω)δ (ω)s
]
(3)
The left-hand side of Eq. (2) is equal to u(xτ+1)Epτ [δ (ω)] + u(xτ+2)Epτ [δ 2ω ] + . . .
where the left-hand side of Eq. (3) is equal to u(xτ+1)+u(xτ+2)Epτ+1 [δ (ω)]+ . . . Let
pτ+1(ω) =
pτ(ω)δ (ω)
∑ω ′∈Ω pτ(ω ′)δ (ω ′)
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then equality (3) becomes
∞
∑
s=0
u(xτ+1+s)
[
∑
ω∈Ω
pτ(ω)δ (ω)s+1
∑ω ′∈Ω pτ(ω ′)δ (ω ′)
]
=
∞
∑
s=0
u(yτ+1+s)
[
∑
ω∈Ω
pτ(ω)δ (ω)s+1
∑ω ′∈Ω pτ(ω ′)δ (ω ′)
]
that corresponds to u(xτ+1)+u(xτ+2)Epτ [δ (ω)2]·M+. . .= u(yτ+1)+u(yτ+2)Epτ [δ (ω)2]·
M+. . ., where M= [Epτ [δ (ω)]]
−1. Multiplying both sides by M−1, we have u(xτ+1)Epτ [δ (ω)]+
u(xτ+2)Epτ [δ (ω)2]+. . .= u(yτ+1)Epτ [δ (ω)]+u(yτ+2)Epτ [δ (ω)2]+. . .which is equal-
ity (2).
uunionsq
Proof. Of Theorem 4. Suppose that δτ(ω) = δτ ′(ω) = δ (ω) for all τ,τ ′ and all ω ∈
Ω and uτ ≡ uτ ′ for all τ,τ ′, and we normalize the utilities to be all equal. Then,
conditional time consistency holds if
∑
ω∈E
pτ(ω)
[
u(z)+
∞
∑
s=1
δ (ω)su(xτ+s)
]
= ∑
ω∈E
pτ(ω)
[
u(z)+
∞
∑
s=1
δ (ω)su(yτ+s)
]
or
∞
∑
s=1
u(xτ+s)
[
∑
ω∈E
pτ(ω)δ (ω)s
]
=
∞
∑
s=1
u(yτ+s)
[
∑
ω∈E
pτ(ω)δ (ω)s
]
(4)
is equivalent to:
∑
ω∈Ω
pτ+1,E(ω)
[
u(xτ+1)+
∞
∑
s=1
δ (ω)su(xτ+1+s)
]
= ∑
ω∈Ω
pτ+1,E(ω)
[
u(yτ+1)+
∞
∑
s=1
δ (ω)su(yτ+s)
]
or
∞
∑
s=0
u(xτ+1+s)
[
∑
ω∈Ω
pτ+1,E(ω)δ (ω)s
]
=
∞
∑
s=0
u(yτ+1+s)
[
∑
ω∈Ω
pτ+1,E(ω)δ (ω)s
]
(5)
The left-hand side of Eq. (4) is equal to u(xτ+1)Epτ [δ (ω)] + u(xτ+2)Epτ [δ 2ω ] + . . .
where the left-hand side of Eq. (5) is equal to u(xτ+1)+ u(xτ+2)Epτ+1,E [δ (ω)]+ . . .
Let
pτ+1,E(ω) =
pτ(ω)δ (ω)
∑ω ′∈E pτ(ω ′)δ (ω ′)
if ω ∈ E and 0 otherwise. Then equality (5) becomes
∞
∑
s=0
u(xτ+1+s)
[
∑
ω∈E
pτ(ω)δ (ω)s+1
∑ω ′∈E pτ(ω ′)δ (ω ′)
]
=
∞
∑
s=0
u(yτ+1+s)
[
∑
ω∈E
pτ(ω)δ (ω)s+1
∑ω ′∈E pτ(ω ′)δ (ω ′)
]
that corresponds to u(xτ+1)+u(xτ+2)[∑ω∈E pτ(ω)δ (ω)2]·ME+. . .= u(yτ+1)+u(yτ+2)[∑ω∈E pτ(ω)δ (ω)2]·
ME + . . ., where ME = [∑ω∈E pτ(ω)δ (ω)]
−1. Multiplying both sides by M−1E , we
have u(xτ+1)[∑ω∈E pτ(ω)δ (ω)]+u(xτ+2)[∑ω∈E pτ(ω)δ (ω)2]+. . .= u(yτ+1)[∑ω∈E pτ(ω)δ (ω)]+
u(yτ+2)[∑ω∈E pτ(ω)δ (ω)2]+ . . . which is equality (4).
uunionsq
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Proof. Of Theorem 1. By standard arguments and the cardinal uniqueness of each
vω(·), the Conditional Temporal axiom implies that each conditional preference is
represented by a geometrically discounted utility, hence
x<ω y ⇐⇒
∞
∑
t=0
δ (ω)tuω(xt)≥
∞
∑
t=0
δ (ω)tuω(yt)
for some δ (ω) ∈ (0,1] and uω(·) : [0,1]→ R. Now take two constant act x,y with
x <ω y, by Certainty consistency, x <ω ′ y for all ω ′ ∈ Ω . Then, uω(x) 11−δ (ω) ≥
uω(y) 11−δ (ω) , if and only if, uω ′(x)
1
1−δ (ω ′) ≥ uω ′(y) 11−δ (ω ′) , or uω(x)≥ uω(y), if and
only if, uω ′(x) ≥ uω ′(y). Since it holds for any x,y, uω(·) and uω ′(·) represent the
same preferences over X , by uniqueness up to positive affine transformation of both
we can equate all the uω(·) = u(·).
uunionsq
Proof of the Example 2 in Section 7. Suppose that (x, t)∼ (y, t+1), then
VS(h) = ∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω) ln
(
δ tωu(x)
)
= ∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω) ln
(
δ t+1ω u(y)
)
=VS(h′)
equivalently
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω)(t ln(δω))+ lnu(x) = ∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω)((t+1) ln(δω))+ lnu(y) ⇐⇒
t ∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω)(ln(δω))+ lnu(x) =(t+1) ∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω)(ln(δω))+ lnu(y) ⇐⇒
lnu(x) = ∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω)(ln(δω))+ lnu(y) ⇐⇒
VS(g) =VS(g′)
I would like to thank the editor and two anonymous referees for helpful com-
ments.
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